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4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA
5	CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION
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10	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF VIRTUAL PUBLIC MEETING
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14	Phoenix, Arizona
15	May 19, 2022
16	9:29 a.m.
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21	COASH & COASH, INC. Court Reporting, Video & Videoconferencing
22	1802 N. 7th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85006 602-258-1440 Staff@coashandcoash.com
23	
24	By: Kathryn A. Blackwelder, RPR Certified Reporter
25	Certificate No. 50666

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1	Fage 2 VIRTUAL PUBLIC MEETING BEFORE THE CITIZENS		Fage 4
2	CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION convened at 9:29 a.m. on May	1	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you. I will
	19, 2022, at the State of Arizona, Clean Elections	2	call the roll on approval of the minutes.
3		3	Commissioner Chan.
4	Commission, 1616 West Adams, Conference Room, Phoenix,	4	COMMISSIONER CHAN: I vote aye.
5	Arizona, in the presence of the following Board	5	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Commissioner Paton.
6	Members:	6	COMMISSIONER PATON: Aye.
7	Mr. Mark Kimble, Acting Chairperson Ms. Amy Chan	7	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: And I'm Mark Kimble
8	Mr. Galen Paton	8	and I vote aye too.
9	OTHERS PRESENT:	9	Item III, discussion and possible action on
10	Thomas M. Collins, Executive Director Paula Thomas, Executive Officer	10	the Executive Director's Report.
11	Mike Becker, Policy Director	11	Tom.
12	Gina Roberts, Voter Education Director Avery Xola, Voter Education Specialist	12	MR. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
13	Avery Xola, Voter Education Specialist Julian Arndt, Executive Support Specialist Kara Karlson, Assistant Attorney General Kyle Cummings, Assistant Attorney General	13	Commissioners. You can see it's been a little while
14	Kyle Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Ken Matta, Former SOS Chief Election Security		since we met, so there's there was quite a bit of
15	Officer Cathy Herring, Staff		activity we had that we wanted to report on.
16	Cathy Herring, Staff Rivko Knox, Member of the Public	16	I first want to you know, as we did in the
17			report, I want to highlight the fact that Avery Xola,
18		18	(unintelligible) now our voter education manager, was
19			accepted into the Flinn-Brown Fellows program. And as
			the report details, that's a highly selective
20			fellowship program that where Avery will be able to
21			
22			meet with and and be engaged in professional
23			development with a bunch of with a lot of different
24			aspects of state government and experts in that area,
25		25	which we think and we have been lucky and well,
	Page 3		Page 5
1	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Chairman Meyer is	1	no I've been lucky and I think that we've
	unable to make the meeting today, so I've been asked to		benefited obviously, the Commission and State have
	chair this meeting.		benefited from the fact that we've had a number of
	Agenda Item I is the call to order. It is		employees who have been selected for this program over
4	0		the over the past several years, including Gina.
	9:30 a.m. on May 19th, 2022. I call this meeting of the Citizens Clean Elections Commission to order	5	
	the Citizens Clean Elections Commission to order.	6	Anyway, so I think that's a real benefit
7	I would like to ask audience members to		to to the Commission and and to making sure that
	please keep their microphones on mute.		our voter education program continues to be tied
9	And with that, we will take attendance.		together with, you know, information and expertise on
	Commissioners, please identify yourselves for the		the variety of issues with which we deal. So it's a
	record.		great thing for Avery, but also really a great thing
12	COMMISSIONER CHAN: I'm Amy Chan.		for the entire Clean Elections family, and so we're
13	COMMISSIONER PATON: Galen Paton.		super, super happy about that.
14	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: And I am Mark	14	You know, as you can see and you know,
15	Kimble. We do have a quorum present.		everyone, particularly Gina and Avery and Alec and
16	Item II, discussion and possible action on		Julian, Mike, and Paula, have been working on the Voter
	minutes for the March 24th, '22 meeting. We all got		Education Guide. It will be arriving in mailboxes
	those those minutes with our material. Is there any		starting June 24th. Our goal you know, our
19	discussion about the minutes?		statutory obligation is to get it out the door before
20	COMMISSIONER CHAN: I move that we adopt the	20	early voting starts. And we're, you know, pleased with
1	minutes as written.	21	the participation; we have 35 statewide candidates, 197
			legislative candidates. And, you know, and it's
	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you. And that	22	registative candidates. Thid, you know, and it's
21 22	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you. And that		
21 22		23	important to note that this year is redistricting. So,
21 22 23	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you. And that motion was made by Commissioner Chan.	23 24	

Public Me	eting
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	zens Crean Elections Commission	1	
	Page 6		Page 8
1	So I think that this is a you know, it's	1	wanted to highlight and would urge you, if you have
2	an important tool for voters both in terms of the	2	time, to take a look at our survey and tools related to
3	information contained about how to access their ability	3	the survey. I hope my plan is to next month have
4	to vote and the statements from the candidates, which	4	our Mike Noble, who is our surveyor or, pollster,
5	are unintermediated, you know, there's not a not a		for lack of a better way to word it I hate to use
	it's not an ad. I mean, it's whatever the candidate		that word talk to us a little about more about
	wants to say, but it has their name on it, it's what		where voters are and what they want to hear about. But
	they submitted, and I think that's important.		that data is online, and we have Alec developed a
9	But I think also important, the fact that we		and Gina developed a hub where voters can go, go
	continue to mail it, in addition to the other ways it's		through the data about what voters are saying.
	delivered. It ensures that, you know, there's a	11	We also have recorded and put on our website
	there's essentially a baseline amount of information		interviews with subject matter experts so, you know,
	that every voter in the state receives about their		Sarah Porter from the Kyl Center for Water; Beth
	ability to participate in elections.		Falone, who some of you may know, who's a well
	• • •		
15	Our primary election debates, likewise, are		respected expert on state budget; Tom Betlach, who many
	under way. That's been, you know, occupying a lot of		of you may know was the long-time head of the State
	peoples' a lot of everyone's time. We have our		Medicaid program under Governor Governor Brewer and Governor Hull and then he worked for the first for
	legislative debates are being live streamed on YouTube.		
19	Last night I was talking before the		Governor Ducey's first term all on their subject
	meeting to Cathy, who Cathy Herring, who is our		area, you know, water, budget, you know, healthcare.
	who's coordinating this meeting, but she also		So, you know, we've gotten some good press exposure on
	coordinates helps, you know, do the technical end of		that.
	our debates. And she and Mike were at our LD 12 debate	23	And I think the goal here is to try to take,
	online last night, and the questions were coming in		you know, the survey, which tells us a lot about where
25	very quickly. We got I mean, we were getting	25	voters what voters want to hear from candidates
	Page 7		Page 9
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	Page 10		Page 12
1	other things you want to highlight there, I'm	1	have a unique, ongoing, institutional aspect to your
	obviously, I would defer to you.		roles as Commissioners specifically that is outside of
3	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Well, let me just		the election cycle, right. So I think it's really
	say, Tom, in relation to Commissioner Chan's question,		important that that we continue to keep our eye on
	I looked at that survey. It's very impressive. It's		those things.
	broken down by political party. It's broken down by	6	You can see there, one quick note, there's
	geographic areas of the state. It's very interesting		the case Arizona Republican Party v. Hobbs. That was a
	to see the different issues that people in different		special action we discussed that we did discuss in
	areas of the state are focused on. Obviously,		March that essentially seeks to bar vote by mail in the
	different political parties, we know that they're		state. Since I wrote the Executive Director's Report,
	focused on different different spots, but it's a		the Republican party has now sued taken that suit,
12	very impressive survey.	12	which was denied by the State Supreme Court, they have
13	MR. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yeah,	13	now filed essentially that same suit in Mohave County
14	we're we're happy about that.	14	and brought in, instead of the State of Arizona, which
15	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Tom, I'm sorry. Did	15	is who they who they sued in addition to the
16	you were you done?		Secretary of State's Office, they've brought they've
17	MR. COLLINS: No. Oh, I just wanted		tried they've sued all 15 County Recorders and the
18	unless anyone has anything else on that topic, I was		Secretary of State's Office.
	just going to really quick hit some of the legal	19	Why Mohave County? You know, if you're
	things. So I want to make sure that more for		interested, I mean, the idea here is pretty obvious,
	awareness.		that the plaintiffs in the case think that there is
22	Obviously, you know, we have a couple of		somehow a better judicial opportunity for them there.
	cases out there that we're involved in. But then, you		It's a little weird, quite honestly. I practice
	know, in the last, you know, sort of 45, 50 days since		election law in the state, as have you know, and
	we met, there's a lot a number of different		worked in those areas, as have most of the staff and
2.5	we net, there is a lot a number of unrefere	2.5	worked in those areas, as have most of the staff and
	Page 11		Page 13
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	election-related lawsuits that have come along or been		obviously Commissioner Chan. This is not this sort
2	election-related lawsuits that have come along or been filed. You know, first, there continues to be	2	obviously Commissioner Chan. This is not this sort of idea that you can shop around to different counties
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Citi	zens Clean Elections Commission		
	Page 14		Page 16
1	rejected this a law, part of the McCain-Feingold	1	it's been a very busy certainly we did cancel last
	Act, that says that people could not sort of loan		month's meeting, but not for lack of work on the part
	themselves campaign money as a candidate, and if they		of the staff, who continued to be busy and, I think,
	wanted to recover that money they had a limited amount		effective on a day-to-day basis.
	and a limited time frame in which to do it. That is	5	
	now unconstitutional.	6	that concludes the ED report, Mr. Chairman, if you have
7	As a practical matter, you know, I don't		any questions.
8	believe that in Arizona there's a similar restriction.	8	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Tom.
9	And, in fact, you've seen in the past we have had	9	
	candidates who've made personal loans, have been able	10	I wanted to just take a minute to join you in
11	to go back and obtain, you know, under the contribution	11	congratulating Avery. That's quite an accomplishment.
12	limit, obviously, contributions, but so but, it's	12	To be a Flinn Foundation Fellow reflects obviously very
13	sort of a sign of the overall deregulatory aspect of	13	well on Avery and also on on the Commission.
14	that.	14	Are there any other discussion or questions
15	Finally well, just real quick, Gina was a	15	from Commission Members on Tom's report?
16	facilitator, which we're thrilled about, with the	16	COMMISSIONER PATON: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
	Secretary of State's tabletop exercise on election	17	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Commissioner Paton.
18	security. We'll hear a little bit more, obviously,	18	COMMISSIONER PATON: Couple of things. First
19	about election security in a few minutes, but I	19	of all, I saw an advertisement for Clean Elections on
	think I think it's an important important to	20	my Facebook and it was it was very, very good. It
	highlight that that work that she's doing and the		talked about this guy being in a maze and trying to
	fact that, you know, she continues to be recognized		find his way through the election conundrum, and he
	by you know, by the election community for her		found Clean Elections and it brightened his day. And I
24	you know, for her knowledge and skills.		thought that was a really good advertisement,
25	You know, we have two complaints that we're	25	especially with all the everything going on about
	Page 15		Page 17
1		1	-
	still that are still pending. I really don't have		elections.
2	still that are still pending. I really don't have an update that I can provide at this point on those. I	2	elections. And then secondly, Tom, can you explain
2 3	still that are still pending. I really don't have an update that I can provide at this point on those. I couldn't I can't provide a detailed update because	2 3	elections. And then secondly, Tom, can you explain basically what's going on about this move? Is it
2 3 4	still that are still pending. I really don't have an update that I can provide at this point on those. I couldn't I can't provide a detailed update because of some of the ex parte and due process issues that are	2 3 4	elections. And then secondly, Tom, can you explain basically what's going on about this move? Is it permanent and is it around the corner or what?
2 3 4 5	still that are still pending. I really don't have an update that I can provide at this point on those. I couldn't I can't provide a detailed update because of some of the ex parte and due process issues that are involved in the case law, but suffice it to say, I	2 3 4 5	elections. And then secondly, Tom, can you explain basically what's going on about this move? Is it permanent and is it around the corner or what? MR. COLLINS: Mr. Chairman, Commissioner
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Citi	zens Clean Elections Commission		
	Page 18		Page 20
1	So I think I'm going to it's one of these	1	building with better security. I think the space is
2			going to work great.
3	think it's DOA, right, Mike, that we're moving to	3	We are condensing down space substantially.
4		-	Having shared, you know, our public meeting rooms with
5	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Mike.		both with both agencies is going to be a plus for us
6	MR. COLLINS: Anyway, we're moving oh, I'm		too. We'll have more technology. As technology
7	sorry.		continues to evolve, we'll be a little bit better with
8	MR. BECKER: I'll have Paula give you more		what we can do. But overall, there's a lot of pluses
9	information on that. She's got all the details on the		for the agency being able to relocate. Especially the
	exact location. But, yeah, Tom, is right, our building		security is a plus for us, as we're just kind of an
	currently is in bad shape and we need to leave.		open fish right there, right across from where
12	MR. COLLINS: So anyway, so long story short,		everything kind of happens. So that's it.
13	Commissioner Chairman Kimble, Commissioner Paton, it	13	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Paula.
14	is a permanent move. We'll be in a smaller space,	14	Any other discussion or questions from the
15	combined with the Pharmacy Board. We'll still have a	15	Commissioners?
16	hearing room that we share. I think that the State	16	(No response.)
17	and Paula, if you want to jump in here, obviously, I	17	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Okay. Thanks, Tom.
18	think that's or, Commissioner Paton, if you want	18	Item IV
19	more detail.	19	MR. COLLINS: Thank you.
20	The goal ultimately is to end up with, you	20	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: discussion and
21	know, a smaller footprint for State employees and	21	possible
	allow, you know, the redevelopment of the mall area.	22	I'm sorry. Was someone wanting to say
	And so, for example, the Governor's Office has made	23	something?
	clear, through the Department of Administration, that	24	MR. COLLINS: No. I just said thank you.
25	work from home and that kind of flexibility is	25	I'm sorry. I apologize.
	Page 19		Page 21
1	something that's here to stay. There's some cost	1	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: No, that's okay.
2	savings there. And again and so we'll have a little	2	Item IV, discussion and possible action on
3	different format, a little different layout, a little	3	legislative bills on the topics of elections, voting,
4	bit more modernized in terms of, you know, whether or	4	administration, campaign finance.
5	not everybody has an office. It will be more of a	5	To start off this discussion, it's worth
6	we'll have more work spaces and fixed offices and that	6	noting that today is the 130th day of the legislative
7	kind of thing.	7	session. The Senate is adjourned until Monday. The
8	MS. THOMAS: Yeah, I'll just chime in,	8	last time all of us got together the legislature was in
	Commissioners. Chairman, Commissioners, as Tom and	9	its 74th day of session.
	Mike mentioned, the State is in the process of	10	Staff, I think, has a brief update on where
	condensing space. There are actually several agencies		we are, especially on election bills. And then if
	that now permanently work from home, so they don't even		anyone any Commissioners have any questions, we'll
	have an office space. Ours will be more on the	13	go to those.
	premises of an interactive workspace.	14	
15	But another thing with the buildings, I	15	MR. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
	believe they're going to get demoed. They're very old.		Commissioners. We we wanted to highlight
	All agencies in our building are relocating, and I		specifically Julian and Mike and I wanted to and
	think I think all of us, Land Department, Pharmacy		Avery wanted to highlight the couple of bills that have
19	Board, and Clean Elections, will be in the same	19	passed just as sort of like there have been

- 20 building.
- 21 The plus for us is we're going to have better
- **22** security. We've not had the best security in our
- **23** building. There's been a lot of occurrences that
- **24** happened. The building is just very, very old, so
- **25** we're excited to be in a little bit more modernized

25 passed.

20 significant, you know, election bills passed. The big

22 that's on the -- that will be on the ballot is a revamp

24 as Prop 200. So those have -- those have already

21 one, obviously, we talked about is 2492. Another one

23 of the voter ID provisions of what was passed in 2004

Public Meeting

	Page 22		Page 24
1	There's also a bill that's passed that	1	and the presidential election. But most of those
	tweaks, I think appropriately, the amount the due		passed or, all of them passed with pretty bipartisan
	date for campaign finance reports to put it on a		support.
	fixed on a fixed Monday instead of instead of	4	
	like the 15th, where it sort of rolls inconsistently to	5	
	the next Monday when it falls on a weekend.	6	
7	You know, so there are you know, so that	7	
8	was the goal of the report, to try to highlight some of	8	(No response.)
	those at the front end of the of the report, which	9	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Julian.
10	is attached to the Executive Director's Report.	10	Anything else, Tom, on this topic?
11	I think and I was going to ask,	11	MR. COLLINS: The one Mr. Chairman, yes.
12	Mr. Chairman, if I may. I think there's been some	12	The one other bill I wanted to highlight is there's a
13	action just in the last couple of days on a couple of	13	bill there's a bill called 2289 and it is the
14	bills that have that have now gone to the Governor	14	bill it is the bill that and we talked about it
15	at least. I'm not sure I don't think they've been	15	before. This is the bill that, amongst other things,
	signed. So Julian, if Mr. Chairman, if you don't	16	bans election tabulation equipment and requires only
17	mind, if we could ask Julian to kind of update us on	17	precinct voting and requires hand counts of elections
18	what's happened just in the last couple of days.	18	in 24 hours after the election ends.
19	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Sure.	19	It is and we've and we've talked about
20	Julian.		this, and I've been pretty blunt with you all about it.
21	MR. ARNDT: Yeah, Chairman, Commissioners.		It doesn't putting aside all the ideological stuff
	So of course there hasn't been any action for a month,		associated with the bill, it's impractical on a level
	and then two days before the meeting they like to get		of it's just impractical. It will take I mean,
24	it all in, so that's nice of them.		we saw in the Senate ballot review that it took them
25	Anyway, there were seven bills put up. Three	25	months to count two elections. I mean, it's not and
	Dema 93		Dana 05
	Page 23		Page 25
	of them did not pass, but there were four that passed		our ballot with the ballot styles among the
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Citt	Zens Clean Elections Commission		
	Page 26		Page 28
1	You know, again you know, we have not been	1	folks into the process in a way that's not, you know,
	down at the legislature on this stuff. I think the		politicized. I think we have you know, but offers
	County Association and Jen Marsden have done a		them a reflection back of what's really going on.
	remarkable job throughout this session of being able to		That's part of the reason why the survey makes sense.
	communicate with legislators about the key practical		You know, it's telling us, look, this election fever is
	problems with some of this legislation.		not it's not widespread, but, on the other hand, you
7	I think the issue, though, however, that we		know, it's persistent. And so I just want to make sure
	have to keep our eye on is, you know, when or if this		that everybody sort of understands where you know,
	sort of legitimacy or, delegitimate		where that may be, because I think over time there's a
	delegitimizing rhetoric around some of these bills, you		value to having a nonpartisan institution that can, you
11	know, how we continue to address that. Again, as I	11	know, be effective on these kind of issues over time.
12	said earlier, I mean, it's important to be respectful	12	So that was my last spiel. I apologize if
13	of voters and to be respectful of voters' time,	13	that went on too long, but I wanted to make sure that
14	respectful of voters' information, and then try to	14	we tied those together.
15	communicate with voters about, you know, where things	15	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Tom, could I just
16	are.	16	clarify that you're saying this bill that would require
17	So I worry less about communicating with	17	hand count of ballots to be completed within 24 hours
18	folks who are convinced, incorrectly, in my view,		is, at this point, dead, but could be resurrected as a
	obviously, and some in bad faith, that elections are		bargaining chip in the budget negotiations?
	rigged in some kind of way. That's not the group we	20	MR. COLLINS: Well, I think there's
	need to we need to communicate with.		Mr. Chairman, yes. I mean, I think here is the
22	The group we need to communicate with is the		issue is that there are a couple of Republican
	voters who hear that from people who they trust, even		legislators who have made clear and Julian noted
	if those are not sources we might find trustworthy, and		there are some bills that failed this week, and there
	make sure that we have continue, all of us in the		have been some bills that have failed throughout the
			have been some onis that have raned throughout the
	Page 27		Page 29
1		1	-
	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously		process, because there are some a couple of
2	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously many, many other people are involved in the process	2	process, because there are some a couple of Republican legislators who have sort of held the line
2 3	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously many, many other people are involved in the process here, but we have a role to make sure that there's a	2 3	process, because there are some a couple of Republican legislators who have sort of held the line on this election administration issue, and that's been
2 3 4	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously many, many other people are involved in the process here, but we have a role to make sure that there's a place where they can find information that can that	2 3 4	process, because there are some a couple of Republican legislators who have sort of held the line on this election administration issue, and that's been good.
2 3 4 5	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously many, many other people are involved in the process here, but we have a role to make sure that there's a place where they can find information that can that can bring them along to understand that these kinds of	2 3 4 5	process, because there are some a couple of Republican legislators who have sort of held the line on this election administration issue, and that's been good. The issue on the budget becomes that if
2 3 4 5 6	Commission this is an ongoing I mean, obviously many, many other people are involved in the process here, but we have a role to make sure that there's a place where they can find information that can that can bring them along to understand that these kinds of bills are simply, you know, not not feasible in any	2 3 4 5 6	process, because there are some a couple of Republican legislators who have sort of held the line on this election administration issue, and that's been good. The issue on the budget becomes that if you'd still need to get 16 of 31. So what so if you
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	Page 30	Page 32
1	is not practical. You know, we you know, and we're	1 Republicans and people who are Democrats, scrapped it.
	very happy with that. And, like I said, we've been	2 And there was so as far as in public, you know,
	very we are very pleased with the County	3 there's just been no there's no nothing that
	Association's efforts to lobby on that.	4 we've been able to perceive in public that suggests
5	The more you dig in on something that's sort	5 there's movement there.
6	of over here, right, the question is, how much does	6 ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Okay. Okay. Thank
	that start to pull on stuff that, you know, that's not	7 you.
8	quite that, but certainly would have an adverse impact	8 COMMISSIONER PATON: Chairman.
9	on, you know, on issues that specifically Republican	9 ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Mr Commissioner
10	County Recorders in Pinal County, in Yavapai County	10 Paton.
11	believe would have a negative impact on voters.	11 COMMISSIONER PATON: Yes. I might add that
12	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: So not to prolong	12 they're allowing them to work from home, the
13	this a whole long a whole long time, but so today	13 legislators, so they're not stuck in Phoenix if they
14	is the 130th day of what's supposed to be a 100-day	14 don't live in Phoenix. And usually that's something
15	legislative session. Is there any way to forecast or	15 to motivation for them to be finished. But if I
	do you have a good guess as to when we're going to get	16 read where there's a couple of them, haven't even been
	down to some serious budget negotiations and bargaining	17 to the legislature all year, so that's you know,
	and things like that? Are we a week away from it, are	18 that's less less pressure on them to finish it.
	we a month away from it, or who knows?	19 ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Good point,
20	MR. COLLINS: I don't know. I know that,	20 Commissioner.
	you know, we've you know, we've surveyed folks as	21 Commissioner Chan, any comments on this
	best we Mr. Chairman, I should say, we've surveyed	22 topic?
	folks as best we can. I think that I think the last	23 COMMISSIONER CHAN: No. I didn't realize
	we had been able to gather, there's really no no	24 they were allowing legislators to work from home. I
25	sense of that. But then the legislature, I think, has	25 thought they weren't, which was part of the issue. I
	Page 31	Page 33
1		
	taken time increasingly taken time off during this	1 think those two legislators have a newborn baby at home
2	taken time increasingly taken time off during this session and sort of, you know, slowed things down	 think those two legislators have a newborn baby at home and they were they had asked to be allowed to attend
2 3	taken time increasingly taken time off during this session and sort of, you know, slowed things down considerably. I think that, based on everything we	 think those two legislators have a newborn baby at home and they were they had asked to be allowed to attend virtually. And I thought that was not a choice that
2 3 4	taken time increasingly taken time off during this session and sort of, you know, slowed things down	 think those two legislators have a newborn baby at home and they were they had asked to be allowed to attend
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	Page 34		Page 30
1	an exemption for that. And they can vote virtually,	1	picture of it that I can send you. So next time we see
2	but they have to be in their office.		each other in person, I will deliver that to you. But
3	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Okay. Thanks.		it is in recognition of your service to the state of
4	Anything else on this topic?		Arizona and to Arizona voters and to your contributions
5	(No response.)		to ensuring that Arizona elections are safe and secure
6	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you.		and accurate. So we thank you for your service and we
7	Item V, presentation on election security and	7	look forward to your presentation right now.
	recognition and appreciation to Ken Matta, former	8	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Gina.
9	Secretary of State Chief Election Security Officer.	9	Ken, I'll turn the floor over to you for
10	Ken Matta served for 20 years with the		whatever you'd like to say.
	Arizona Secretary of State's Office, most recently as	11	MR. MATTA: Thank you, Chairman Kimble and
	Chief of Election Security. He recently left for a		Commissioners and Gina. Wow, those were really nice
	private sector role. In his role he was responsible		words.
	for critical election security matters ranging from	14	5
	logic and accuracy testing for election equipment		still going to try to stay relevant in election
	statewide to developing best practices for election		security as much as I can. I'm going to go ahead and
	security.		share I've got a couple slides that will help me get
18	Ken is a State-certified election officer,		through it a little bit. There we go. I'm hoping you
	served as a liaison between the Counties and the		can see that.
	Secretary of State, and served as Chairman of the Arizona Vote Count Verification Committee. He has also	20	Okay. So here is what I'd like to talk about
	worked closely with federal and local partners, such as		real quick, just three major sections here. I would just like to talk about the good work that the good
	the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center and		people are doing in election security across our state.
	the Arizona Cyber Security Task Force.		I would like to look at some of the current things
24	We invited Ken to discuss election security		we're doing, some of the current security initiatives,
2.5	we invited Ren to discuss election security	2.5	we re doing, some of the current security initiatives,
	Page 35		Page 37
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	with us and for the public. We also want to take an		and what we do to secure elections, and then talk about
2	with us and for the public. We also want to take an opportunity to recognize him for his important		and what we do to secure elections, and then talk about the future challenges we have coming up.
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2 3	with us and for the public. We also want to take an opportunity to recognize him for his important contributions to Arizona elections. So, thank you,	2 3 4	and what we do to secure elections, and then talk about the future challenges we have coming up. So we have a great community built in
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1	course, the fine work you guys do, Department of	1	ones just sharing information.
	Homeland Security, DEMA and the National Guard helping,	2	We also have a statewide comms talk spun off
	you know, protect us, and ACTIC, the Arizona Counter		where the communications community gets together and
	Terrorism Information Center, which we use as a central		it's sort of a roundtable discussion and we can take on
	hub of reporting for election security in Arizona.		problems that we face as a community together and share
6			best practices.
7	up in the last few years and really just been super	7	We have policy development projects that
	involved at helping to protect elections across the	8	these aforementioned groups can take on. Sometimes
	country. The FBI, doing just great great work,		we'll spin off work groups to accomplish a security
	great things with us. You know, we have an elections		objective that we have, and we do it together, we do it
	crime coordinator right now for our area, a specific		as a community, and we do it with consensus.
	FBI agent that's assigned to help us with elections and	12	We have statewide tabletop exercises where we
	election security. The Election Infrastructure	13	practice for the worst election you could ever imagine.
	Information Sharing and Analysis Center, it's a		You know, we look at horrible, horrible scenarios that
	mouthful, we call it EI-ISAC, which is a federal agency		could happen in elections and we start working on how
	set up just to share best practices, to share current		we deal with those things ahead of time, before they
	threats, to just move information laterally across the		happen. As well, technical tabletop exercises for the
	country in the election space to help us secure		IT side. We will be rolling out county-specific
	elections. And, of course, the Election Assistance		tabletop exercises. I keep saying "we." But hopefully
	Commission.		we'll see county specific tabletop exercises being
21	As well, we lean on other states and other		offered from the State. Communication workshops and
2	jurisdictions. You know, like I said, this community,		tabletop exercises also on the radar.
	it's a big thing. This doesn't just apply to Arizona.	23	Resource sharing. We found out, you know,
	Arizona is a part of a larger federal community. And	24	across the state there's large counties with resources
25	we have a lot of meetings, we have a lot of	25	and mature security programs, there's also smaller
	Page 39		Page
1	organizations that help us with that to share those	1	counties that have less resources, and so we found out
	best practices, current information.	2	that the larger counties are willing to share their
3			people and their experience to the smaller counties.
4	Stanford, you know, countless other ones helping us in		So if a smaller county needs help implementing a
	the science of elections. Our vendors, our partners in		security feature or program or if they need help doing
6	security, everybody is you know, security is a	6	a security assessment, that the larger counties are
	priority with them. And the private sector as well,	7	willing to share their people, actually put boots on
	you know, companies like Microsoft, Facebook, all		the ground, get them over to the smaller counties to
	just a countless number of vendors that are offering		help them. It's it's actually a great discovery and
			it's a model that I've been sharing on the federal
0	services to help secure elections.	10	it's a model that I've been sharing on the rederat
			level and I hope it kind of gets picked up everywhere.
.1	-		-
.1 .2	In Arizona, let's just talk a little bit	11 12	level and I hope it kind of gets picked up everywhere.
1 2 3	In Arizona, let's just talk a little bit about some of the things going on, we have monthly	11 12 13	level and I hope it kind of gets picked up everywhere. We're doing information and advisory
1 2 3 4	In Arizona, let's just talk a little bit about some of the things going on, we have monthly statewide election security meetings where we build	11 12 13 14	level and I hope it kind of gets picked up everywhere. We're doing information and advisory dissemination, like our federal partners always tell us
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1	tabulate votes in a controlled environment using rules	1	physical problems, if there's a cyber incident, if
2	that were specifically designed to prevent fraud that	2	there's threats against elections, we want to get this
3	they agree to in advance. And again, this speaks to	3	information up the chain to investigative and law
	those hundreds of years in this country that we've been	4	enforcement partners, federal intelligence agencies,
	doing elections. And since there was a ballot box to		because what we're seeing may be part of a larger
	stuff, you know, people have been thinking about ways		pattern, as I was alluding to before. So it's
	to thwart fraud and have fair elections.		important, you know, that we we get this up the
8	A lot of what we've designed, a lot of those		chain, and they can disperse that information across.
_	rules we put in place end up being technology		And they may even be able to stop election security
	independent. It doesn't matter if we're pulling levers		issues before they happen in other states if we all
	or had punch cards or the current equipment we have		share that information. So it's part of our
	today. Many of the rules and procedures in place in		responsibility as part of the larger election security
	election security are layers of security on top of our		community to get that information out there. Also,
	technical layers, and we'll talk a little bit about		getting that information that I was just talking about
	more about that in a minute.		from them to us.
16	We have certain public communication	16	It's important that the Secretary of State
	strategies. This is what we try to push, at the state		and law enforcement have realtime information about
	level, out. We want unified messaging. The worst		what's going on on election day, on times leading up to
	thing that would happen if there was an election	19	elections, actually, at all times, so that we can
20	incident and the press goes to a County and says, hey,	20	prepare responses.
21	what happened here, and then they tell them something.	21	In Arizona we use ACTIC, the Arizona Counter
22	And then they go to, say, the Secretary of State's	22	Terrorism Information Center, as an information hub for
23	Office and say, what happened in that county, and we	23	our nonpublic communications. So ACTIC is an
24	don't know because we haven't talked. So we really	24	organization, and it has representatives from almost
25	want to make sure that we're sharing information about	25	every law enforcement agency in Arizona, as well as our
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	Page 43		Page 45
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	what's really happening so we can we can share the		federal intelligence agencies. They all have seats
2	what's really happening so we can we can share the same messaging, consistent messaging.	2	federal intelligence agencies. They all have seats there. They ingest tons of information from all sorts
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2 3 4 5 6 7	what's really happening so we can we can share the same messaging, consistent messaging. We're trying to really build our communication skill sets. We've had a lot of help from Clean Elections on that. Gina is, you know, probably the leading expert in the state about getting out correct information to the voters about what's really	2 3 4 5 6 7	federal intelligence agencies. They all have seats there. They ingest tons of information from all sorts of sources and from all over the country and they analyze that and decide who needs to know about it. So they we inform them our community informs them of any election incidents that are happening. If there's, you know, an incursion into a
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	zens Clean Elections Commission		
	Page 46		Page 48
1	that's kind of my term, but what that means is public	1	the wrong hands.
	information security.	2	In cyber security I want to point out that
3	In physical security we have to protect our	3	
	voters, our staff, our equipment, and our facilities.		systems, these are the systems that actually count
	This has taken on a new urgency since the 2020		votes and control our elections. These systems in
	election. Before that, we were did not have to		Arizona are air-gapped, they've been air-gapped for
	prepare ourselves as much. I mean, we on our radar		many years, meaning that they're not connected to any
	wasn't things like violent protests or, you know, armed		other network, including the Internet, including our
	incursions possibly into our tabulation centers or our		office networks that are connected to the Internet.
	vote headquarters. We weren't expecting, you know, the		They're stand-alone systems. So if you if you're
	amount of threats that we've received since the 2020		thinking that somewhere, you know, there's a person out
	election. So, you know, we are concerned about		there tapping his keys in another country hacking our
	shootings at the polls. We have counties now that are		voting systems, our actual election systems, the
	offering deescalation training and active shooter		probability of that is almost zero. It's highly
	training to the poll workers. This is new. So we've		improbable.
	had to really we've had a paradigm shift around	16	We also have election office networks, which,
	physical security since the 2020 election.		like most networks, are connected to the Internet. And
18	CISA really lends us a hand with physical		we do things on there like check our e-mail and surf
	security. They come out and do physical security		the web, you know, dangerous activities, you know, from
	assessments on our facilities. They offer that active		a pure security standpoint, and these systems are more
	shooter training. They offer lots of ideas to us to		likely to have a security problem. But just know that
	help us improve our physical security posture. And so,		if one of our office networks was to get breached, they
	like I said, these are all we have a lot of new		wouldn't be able to change a vote. Again, keep in
	challenges since 2020.		mind, the systems that count our votes are not attached
25	Here are some of the statute around physical	25	to any network.
	D 47		
	Page 47		Page 49
		1	-
	security requirements. I'm just going to run over	1	I think it's an important distinction. I
2	security requirements. I'm just going to run over this, because I want us to all understand the scope and	2	I think it's an important distinction. I always make that distinction. Because we may see, you
2 3	security requirements. I'm just going to run over this, because I want us to all understand the scope and magnitude of of the rules in place that help us keep	2 3	I think it's an important distinction. I always make that distinction. Because we may see, you know, a press release that there was, you know, this
2 3 4	security requirements. I'm just going to run over this, because I want us to all understand the scope and magnitude of of the rules in place that help us keep elections secure.	2 3 4	I think it's an important distinction. I always make that distinction. Because we may see, you know, a press release that there was, you know, this election this county election office was breached.
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1	firmware versions that we're using are identical to	1	elections on the inside just know how ridiculous that
	approved versions before we use them.		is. It just can't happen because of all of these
3	The removable storage. Sometimes when it		audit, subaudit, chain of custody rules that we have in
	comes time for us to move information in and out of		place to control elections.
	these air-gapped systems what we'll do is we'll use	5	There's just too much to list. I pulled out
	what we call sneakernet and we'll use like a USB thumb		
			a few pages of them, and I'm just going to buzz through
	drive and we'll move information from one system to our		them. Just, you know, if somebody is watching from the
	election management systems, and these are just rules		public realm, I just hope you understand the extent
	around that kind of storage.		that this has been thought out and preplanned for.
10	It has to be purchased or received from a	10	You know, ballot return envelopes are
	reliable source. The Secretary of State's Office has		tamper-evident. Ballots are mailed out nonforwardable.
	been providing those in the last election. They have		Only one ballot can be returned per voter. There are
13	to be physically secured, like most other election		two-party retrievers of ballots from drop boxes,
14	equipment.	14	meaning, you know, that there's two people going out
15	Oh, I actually didn't remove this next one.	15	there to get them. It's not just one person.
16	I'm going to talk about that a little later. Keep in	16	In Arizona a voter must show ID at the polls.
17	mind, it's not a requirement right now.	17	Voting equipment has to be approved by the State and
18	We can only use them once. We can we have	18	approved by federal agencies. We logic and accuracy
19	to scan them for malicious software. We have to	19	test, in other words, we test to make sure these
20	encrypt them if we're going to physically move them	20	machines work and the programs have not been
	across space and time.		compromised, before and after each election.
22	Here is some stuff around electronic	22	Candidates cannot be poll workers.
23	pollbooks and ballot-on-demand printers. Only	23	Election boards, the people that decide voter
	connected to secure networks. Keep in mind, these	24	intent and the people that duplicate ballots, are
	technologies we don't vote on these technologies.		bipartisan. There's always we're using this buddy
	Page 51		Page 53
1		1	-
	They're sort of vote-adjacent technology. We have to		system through our whole election process to create a
2	They're sort of vote-adjacent technology. We have to use encryption, industry standard encryption when they	2	system through our whole election process to create a self-policing environment.
2 3	They're sort of vote-adjacent technology. We have to use encryption, industry standard encryption when they communicate. They have to be patched and updated as	2 3	system through our whole election process to create a self-policing environment. Voted and unvoted ballots are sealed at the
2 3 4	They're sort of vote-adjacent technology. We have to use encryption, industry standard encryption when they communicate. They have to be patched and updated as recommended by the vendor. Again, no unnecessary	2 3 4	system through our whole election process to create a self-policing environment. Voted and unvoted ballots are sealed at the polls after voting. We check the number of votes cast
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Ciu	Citizens Clean Elections Commission			
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1	So real quick about public information	1	tweet today about another friend and co-worker, just	
2	security a little bit more about it, actually. We		excellent election knowledge, I mean, this person is	
	touched on it a second. You know, in this country	3	just amazing, just leaving the industry as well.	
	voters have sort of turned away from trusted sources of	4	Right now it's a hard time to be in	
	information. Right now it appears to me that a certain	5	elections. It's we experience threats and hatred.	
	amount of the population is willing to take their		You know, we receive the nastiest phone calls and	
	information from about election security and about	7	e-mails. You know, the job was not really a glamorous	
	whether the 2020 election was secure from politicians		and praised job in the first place. It doesn't pay	
	and political pundits, but not from those thousands of		well. And nobody in the election community signed up	
10	people that have been working to secure elections	10	to be abused in the way that we've been being abused	
11	across the country, not from the professionals that do	11	since the 2020 election.	
12	this every day, and so we're making an effort to point	12	As a result, it's attrition. We're losing	
13	the public back to trusted sources of information.	13	our talent and they're going to the private sector,	
14	In Arizona that's Clean Elections, that's the	14	they're just getting out of elections. This is going	
15	Secretary of State's Office, our county recorders, our	15	to create a vacancy in our industry that is going to	
16	county election offices. These are the people that	16	it's going to be hard to replace that loss of	
17	actually perform elections. These are the people who	17	knowledge. But as well, if we think that according	
	actually know how elections work. And I encourage	18	to the recent polls, between 30 to 40 percent of the	
19	anybody listening, if you have if you have questions	19	American public believes the 2020 election was stolen.	
20	about elections and election security, reach out to	20	That means, statistically speaking, many of the jobs in	
	these people and they're more than happy to help you	21	elections that those vacancies create are going to end	
22	understand how elections work.		up being filled by election deniers and election	
23	We've found out that prebunking is better	23	conspiracy theorists.	
	than debunking. You know, a lot of we've seen just	24	5 5 1	
25	so much MDM. I'm going to say MDM. That's	25	election process would be through like political	
	Page 55		Page 57	
	misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.		observers. Secondly, through the as being poll	
2	misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. We've just seen so much of it. And, you know, putting	2	observers. Secondly, through the as being poll workers. It's a pretty easy point of entry into the	
2 3	misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. We've just seen so much of it. And, you know, putting out the truth afterwards doesn't have the same effect	2 3	observers. Secondly, through the as being poll workers. It's a pretty easy point of entry into the process. They could be replacing election staff in our	
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Citi	Citizens Clean Elections Commission			
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1	be there. You know, I want to see our faith restored	1	COMMISSIONER CHAN: I'd like to make a	
2	to our voters. There is absolutely no good reason why	2	comment, Mr. Chairman.	
	a single voter should be questioning the integrity of	3	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Commissioner Chan.	
	our elections at this point. They've been bombarded	4	COMMISSIONER CHAN: I was lucky enough to get	
5	with mis, dis, and mal information about the state of	5	to work with Ken for the, gosh, four years that I	
6	elections is the only reason they're doubting it.		worked at the Secretary of State's Office and then	
7	I'm here to say, you know, our elections are	7	briefly when I just returned before he decided to leave	
8	good. You know, like I said, this is not a new		us, and I just like you said, Mr. Chairman, thank	
	science. If we've thought about this. Whole		you seems like it's not enough. But, Ken, you have	
10	communities of people that are good Americans, you	10	always been such an amazing professional and just such	
11	know, they're our our fellow Americans, our	11	a hard worker and I it's really wonderful to see how	
12	neighbors, our family members, they're election workers	12	it's paid off for you, even if it's a loss for the	
13	and they have high ideals, they have integrity. And	13	State.	
14	the fact that we're doubting this community right now	14	And I'm just very relieved that you're at	
15	is shameful, and I hope it doesn't continue.	15	least staying in the business as a resource for	
16	So I hope that wasn't too doom and gloomy. I	16	everyone. It's been really nice to be able to see that	
17	do have oh, look at this, I had slides on that	17	you're able to communicate to the public and educate	
	stuff. Okay. But I do have faith, you know. This is		them on your own, as an individual, in addition to the	
	America and it's a great country. The next generation		work you've done for the State and the work that you're	
	also, you know, as I speak to young people about this,		going to continue to do at Runbeck, so thank you so	
	they seem to have a clear view of what's really going	21	much.	
	on. They seem to be able to see the demarcation	22	And, Mr. Chairman, I was happy to hear you	
	between political messaging and professional messaging		say that you've been a poll worker for so long. I	
	and they seem more willing to listen to trusted		would encourage everyone who believes in elections and	
25	sources. So around the corner I hope I hope this	25	how they're run to become a poll worker. It's not	
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1	resolves itself, I certainly do. And that's what I've	1	volunteer. I mean, you do get paid. It's not like a	
2	got for you guys, and I thank you for your attention.		ton of money. But I think it's something that's	
3	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thanks, Ken. It		worthwhile to both become educated in how our elections	
_	seems grossly inadequate to just say thank you to you		work, as well as, you know, play a very important role	
	for your decades of service to this state, to our		on election day. We do have most of our voters using	
	community, to elections. And you have so much valuable		vote by mail, and so our election day work is not as	
	information here. I know that we'll find some way to		extensive as it could be, but we still need people to	
	put this on our website so that those who weren't		be in place to put the poll up, take the poll down	
	watching it now will be able to look at it in the		the polling places down, and deliver ballots to	
	future and see how complex the whole topic of election		election central on election night. So it couldn't be	
	security is.		more important now. It's always been important, but it	
12	I've been a poll worker for, I don't know, a		couldn't be more important than it is today. So I	
13	dozen elections or so, and I can say I knew some of it	13	would really encourage everyone who's on this meeting	
14	from working at the polls, but there's so much in there	14	today to consider doing that.	
15	that you said that I had no idea about.	15	And I just, again, thank you, Ken, for your	
16	I particularly appreciate your definition of	16	service, and really happy that you didn't retire	
	an election. I thought that really crystallized the	17	completely.	
	challenges that are faced. And when it comes down to	18	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you,	
	it, it's really pretty simple: We want an election	19		
	that is fair and that everyone can agree is fair and	20	Any other comments or questions,	
	secure.	21		
22	So thank you for your presentation. Thanks	22	COMMISSIONER PATON: Yes, a couple things. I	
	for your years of service to the state.		wonder if you couldn't do a primmer for the	
24	Do any of my colleagues, Commissioners, have		legislature, you know, a little workshop for them,	
	any comments or questions?	25	since they want to be all verbose about elections. And	
25			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

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1	maybe we could get a copy of this little presentation	1	morning with Mr. Matta have been absolutely
	to PBS or I mean, it sounds like that we could get		outstanding.
	this information out in the public to where like you	3	And I know one of the things that I've been
	said, they have they have their ways of getting	4	
	messages out to poor losers, basically. And it's just	5	
	a shame that somehow we should be able to get it out	6	important it is for the small counties to have the
	to somebody anyway, some public thing.		resources to be able to attract and retain people who
8	I think many in the public, maybe they grew		are knowledgeable about election security, things that
9	up at a different time. My dad lived in Jim Wells		are very technical. And with small budgets, even if
	County in Texas in 1948, Box 13. And some of these		they hire an expert, how do you keep them from going to
11	old-timers, they remember dead people voting in Chicago	11	the private sector, because you can't match the pay?
12	and whatever and they don't realize that things have	12	And I think that's an element that needs to be
13	changed. There's all kinds of security involved.	13	stressed.
14	So anyway, that's my input. Thank you for	14	I'm just wondering if those interviews might
15	all you've done and continue to do.	15	be made available. I mean, I know anybody can watch a
16	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you,	16	Commission meeting online; but with all due respect,
17	Commissioner Paton.	17	they are, you know, an hour and a half or two hours.
18	Any other comments?		But I wondered if those interviews might be posted as a
19	(No response.)		way to get more people to observe them, then same thing
20	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thanks again, Ken.	20	with Mr. Matta's presentation today.
21		21	And then I have only one other comment for
22	MR. MATTA: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,		Mr. Matta's presentation, which was absolutely
23	and the entire Commission. I really appreciate you.		outstanding. There are so many acronyms. And I am not
24	ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thanks again.		in the election community, even though I've been a poll
25	MR. MATTA: I've also got to say, I really	25	worker for years and as a League member, you know, we
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1	appreciate the work you do.	1	study elections and so on. But I would hope that the
2			presentation, if it's available online, would ensure
3	have an outstanding staff, and we couldn't do what we		that there is like a list of acronyms, because there
4	do without them. Thank you.	4	are pages you showed, Mr. Matta, with initials only.
5	Okay. We're going to move on to Item VI,	5	And I kept writing madly, and I didn't get them all.
6	public comment. This is the time for consideration of	6	But tremendous information that I hope you share much
	comments and suggestions from the public. Action taken	7	more widely with the public.
	as a result of public comment will be limited to	8	And again, thank you all, both the
9	directing staff to study the matter or rescheduling the	9	Commissioners and the staff, for just continuing to do
	matter for further consideration and decision at a		what you do. Your work is more and more important
	later date or responding to criticism.		every time. And I appreciate everything that you do as
12	Does any member of the public wish to make		just a voter and citizen, and thank you. Have a good
	comments?		day and
14	Rivko.	14	-
15	MS. KNOX: Good morning, Chairman and Members	15	
	of the Commission and staff. Although I was not		about how these presentations can be accessed after the
17			fact? Are they archived on our website?
	observed them. I saw them online. And I do report	18	MR. COLLINS: Yes. So I think I can I
	to write up reports to a number of people who are in		think I can, especially because the presentation itself
	the League, I'm not an official League observer, but a		is on the agenda. The presentations are on our
	lot of people in the League who are very concerned about this issue.		website. I hope to within a reasonable amount of time. I think we can pull them together in some kind of
22		122	time I think we can pull them together in some kind of
23	I really wanted to especially thank the		a package that plays them.

24 Commission. The last three meetings where you had

25 election professionals, the county recorders, and this

24

The presentations -- Rivko is right, and the

25 goal of having these presentations is to be able to

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	have a public record available, and Commissioner Paton is right, to folks that can come and get you know, who want to drill down on some of these issues like Ken was discussing, you know, to make that available and to piece it out in a way that you know, that is more accessible. I think, you know, the core here and just to again, I think this is just all if you look at this agenda and what we've discussed today, the goal here is to, you know, establish a bank of resources that is not partisan, that doesn't turn over with an election, that is not driven by the election calendar of politicians, but the election calendar of voters, you know. Because, you know, if you listen to what Ken is saying about public information, the public information sphere is very tenuous right now. And it's quite clear that election officials, of which we all are one, whether or not we realize it or not, are in a process of trying to determine what is the best way to move forward. We've seen privately funded efforts. We've seen publicly funded efforts. We have as Ken mentioned, the Secretary of State has a communications group that meets. So one of the things that we can offer that is unique really, I think, in the whole	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Commissioner Paton. I'll do a roll call on our motion to adjourn. Commissioner Chan. COMMISSIONER CHAN: I vote aye. ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Commissioner Paton. COMMISSIONER PATON: Aye. ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: The Chair also votes aye. We are adjourned. Thank you very much. (The meeting concluded at 11:03 a.m.) (The meeting concluded at 11:03 a.m.)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Page 67 country at this point is a is a nonpartisan resource bank for this information that's optimized I mean, like everybody and we all hear this from folks, our website is great. Alec has done a wonderful job of keeping our web content best in the state. You know, this is a model for how you start to have real, tangible, nonpartisan information for voters to ensure that we can have a bulwark against this misinformation and disinformation problem. ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Okay. MR. COLLINS: That's a very long answer. ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: No. No. Thank you, Tom. Let me also add that anyone watching this can send comments to the Commission by mail or e-mail at ccec@azcleanelections.gov. At this time, I would entertain a motion to adjourn. COMMISSIONER CHAN: I move that Mr. Chairman, I move we adjourn. ACTING CHAIRMAN KIMBLE: Thank you, Commissioner Chan. Is there a second? COMMISSIONER PATON: I second. This is Galen Paton.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	<pre>11 12 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am in no way related 13 in any way interested in the outcome hereof. 14 15 DATED at Tempe, Arizona, this 23rd day of 16 May, 2022. 17 18 19 Kathryn A. Blackwelder, RPR Certified Reporter #50666 21 22 23 24</pre>

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